Roundtable Discussion on October 9, 2002, IACP 2002 Conference – Minneapolis, MN
Homeland Security-Managing the Threats of the Future including Dirty Bombs

• O-Observations of participants
• C-Challenges we face
• S- Suggested solutions

O- While The FBI has federal jurisdictional authority, state, county and local officers have concurrent jurisdiction and they will be the first responders to threats.

O- Our primary goal should be prevention, but funding seems to be oriented to response to incidents.

O- The threat related to a dirty bomb is primarily psychological. Its greatest destructive power is in the actual explosion, rather that in radiation.

O- Unconventional tactics are being deployed against our traditional defenses.

C- Panic and overreaction by the public are likely to cause as much damage and injury, as any actual dirty bomb. This reaction would certainly delay and interfere with first responders’ access to the scene.

S- Hire and train qualified PIOs and exercise message control and provide factual threat information to the public to reduce panic responses

C- Local officers are not getting access to federal intelligence

S-Joint Terrorism Task Forces and the US Attorney’s Anti-Terrorism Task Forces are excellent sources of federal intelligence. The amount and quality of analysis is enhanced with participation by local agencies. If you can afford to do so, assign personnel to them.

S- Federal agencies could use state Chiefs associations to distribute intelligence.

S- Dallas FBI has established Infraguard, an internet based site where security professionals from all sectors can submit info and summaries are e-mailed out to members including local Chiefs. It also gives the FBI an e-mail notification list to use when they have local threat information to send out rapidly.

C-Concern over the demand for federal backgrounds investigations for security clearances.

S-It’s not the SAC or the agency. It’s the Law. Turn in your packet and most are trying to turn them around in 30 days.

C-Thousands of foreign residents have overstayed their authorized time frames in the US and they pose a threat. Focusing on them is easier than trying to address all their potential targets. INS has administrative warrants that cannot be served by local officers. Local officers don’t even now who they are.

S-INS is piloting a program to criminalize these warrants to allow local officers to arrest them. Work with your JTTF to help ID them.

C- Overwhelmingly large amounts of intelligence are being received.

S- We all need to assign people to analyze and prioritize intelligence. Analysts should have a law enforcement background/perspective.

S- We need automated intelligence analysis programs to separate the critical from the routine.

S- Someone (Homeland Security?) should consolidate, correlate, and analyze intelligence. Then they should send out a daily intelligence update, routed by criteria set up by end users. For example, I am Chief in middle America and I don’t need threats against ports on the west coast, but I do need intelligence about threats against the defense contractors or nuclear power plants in my city.

C- We are not prepared for a major event.

S-Use current Emergency Preparedness plans to adapt for terrorism and include a clear command and control structure. IACP should develop a model plan. Local plans should be developed, which feed into regional plans, which feed into statewide plans, which feed into the federal response plan.

S- Tabletop exercises are a necessity to identify plan weaknesses and must include all parties that would respond.

S- Law Enforcement Executive Committees could facilitate regional responses, as well as intelligence coordination in advance of an attack.

S- Need to protect first responders with proper equipment.

C-No interoperable radio communications.

S-Create a national technology standard for interoperable emergency communications.